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DYING DECLARATIONS
By HARRY A. FRUMESS, D. U. Law School, Class 1940
HE rule which allows the admissibility in evidence of
the dying declarations of a person as related to one not a
party to the proceedings and who is present in court has
come to be recognized as an exception to the rule which excludes hearsay evidence. The general hearsay rule is to the
effect that, "Statements made to one not a party in interest by
one not a party to the proceedings and not made under oath
are inadmissible in evidence, since such statements are not
spoken under the sanction of an oath, and there is no opportunity to investigate the speaker's character and motives or to
observe his deportment on the witness stand."
The exception of dying declarations dates back as far as
the first half of the eighteenth century, a period when the hearsay rule was coming to be systematically and strictly enforced.
The ruling of Lord Mansfield in Wright v. Littler, in 1761, is
generally taken as the leading case, although the notion that a
special trust may be imposed on deathbed statements had already been long understood. An orthodox limitation was
that the declarant should have been made unavailable by death.
This is amply shown by cases and treatises up to the beginning
of the nineteenth century. In particular, there is found to be
no distinction between civil and criminal cases, or between the
various kinds of criminal cases. But at this point, the misconstrued words of a treatise-writer commenced a theory of the
rule which in the next generation obtained full sway and must
be now be taken as orthodox. The language was that of Serjeant East, in 1803, "There is a kind of evidence more peculiar
to the case of homicide, which is the declaration of the deceased, after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself and the party
by whom committed." Although this statement was set out
in a chapter on "Homicide," it was probably not intended to
refer only to homicide cases. A few nisi prius courts, however, took the language as stating a general rule, and the declaration came to be limited to cases of homicide only. Thus,
the language led to a change of practice in England, and its
influence is clearly traced in subsequent American cases. Finally, in 1860, a note of Chief Justice Redfield, in his edition of
Professor Greenleaf's treatise, gave it the widest credit and led
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to its general acceptance. Redfield said that the true ground
for the rule was to be found in the necessity of apprehending
murderers in homicide cases, and that only this grave necessity
overcame such objections to the hearsay rule as the lack of
cross-examination and the admission of a statement not made
under oath. This note by Redfield indicates that the principle
of admitting dying declarations because of necessity was
changed from allowing such evidence because the testimony
of the deceased was not available, to one allowing the declaration only where the court felt that some social purpose could
be served thereby. But Justice West, in Thurston v. Fritz, 91
Kan. 468, 138 P. 625, in discussing the history of the rule
admitting dying declarations, said, "It would seem that the
courts first conceived and recognized the sanction which impending death would give to the statement and that this was
rather a predecessor than an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence; that after hearsay had become generally regarded as inadmissible, it was reasoned that dying declarations inherently belong in that class, but that, as a matter
of public policy or necessity, their legitimacy should be recognized in homicide cases only. The real basis of admissibility,
aside from any supposed theory of necessity, is the notion
which long ago became a rule of law, that the conscious danger
of impending death is equivalent to the sanction of an oath."
But whether the true basis for the rule is that of necessity or
the sanction given to a statement made under an apprehension
of impending death, between 1806 and 1874, all the courts
gradually adopted the rule limiting dying declarations to cases
of homicide; and the rule is in force generally throughout the
United States and England today.
Until very recently, Colorado had followed this general
restrictive rule as to the admissions of dying declarations in
cases of homicide. The only exception to the rule in Colorado
was announced in Clarke v. People, 16 Colo. 511, in which
the court allowed a dying declaration where the crime of causing an abortion was charged. In this case the court, without
discussion, allowed a statement by the decedent "in extremis"
as to the cause of her condition, without apparently realizing
that it was departing from the general rule. No other case
involving the admission in abortion cases has since arisen in
Colorado; but in other cases the court followed the orthodox
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rule. Thus in Mora v. People, 19 Colo. 255, and Brennan
v. People, 37 Colo. 256, the court held that a dying declaration is admissible only where the death of the declarant is the
subject of a charge of homicide in a public prosecution; that it
must be made when the declarant is under a sense of impending
death; and that it can relate only to circumstances preceding
the homicide. The case of Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo. 134,
also a homicide case, stressed the fact that the dying declaration
was an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the defendant
could not, therefore, object on the ground that he had had no
opportunity to cross-examine or confront the witness. The
early cases of McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, and Graves
v. People, 18 Colo. 170, stated that if the person expected to
recover, the declaration was inadmissible, since the reason for
the admission was that approaching death made the truth of
the statement probable. The McBride case also set forth the
restriction that the declaration cannot be made in answer to
questions put to the declarant, because a declaration must be
absolutely uninfluenced. It was cases such as these that developed certain restrictions to the rule, which were later incorporated into the statute, which we shall soon consider.
This rule, that dying declarations are limited to homicide
and abortion cases, was finally abrogated in Colorado in 1937
(Chapter 145, Session Laws of 1937). This statute reads as
follows:
"The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be admissible in
evidence in all civil and criminal trials and other proceedings before
Courts, Commissions, and other tribunals to the same extent and for
the same purposes that they might have been admissible had the deceased
survived and been sworn as a witness in the proceedings, under the following restricitoas:-To render the declarations of the deceased competent evidence, it must be satisfactorily proved:
(1) That at the time of the making of such declaration, he was
conscious of approaching death and believed there was no hope of recovery;
(2) That such declaration was voluntarily made, and not through
the persuasion of any person;
(3)
That such declaration was not made in answer to interrogatories calculated to lead the deceased to make any particular statement;
(4) That he was of sound mind at the time of making the declaration."

This statute was intended to prevent the result of a case
such as Saum v. Friberg, 82 Colo. 395, a custody case, in
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which the court refused to admit a mother's dying declaration
as to the moral character of the father of the children, the statements referring to the unhappy married life of decedent, caused
by the moral unfitness of the father. This case was severely
criticized by Wigmore, who characterized it as an example of
the lamentable state of the American law of evidence, and it is
to Colorado's credit that we are among the foremost to aid in
changing the American rule. The Colorado statute is not,
however, without precedent. Dean Wigmore, in his classic
work on Evidence, says, "There is no reason for saying the necessity exists in homicide cases and not in rape and robbery
cases or even in civil cases. The limitations are heresies of the
present century and have not even the sanction of antiquity.
They should be wholly abolished by legislation." (Wigmore,
2nd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 1436.) The author then goes on, in the
same section, to say, "The notion that crime is more worthy
the attention of courts than a civil wrong is a traditional relic
of the days when civil justice was administered in the royal
courts as a purchased favor, and criminal prosecutions in the
king's name were zealously encouraged because of the fines
which added to the royal revenues. The sanction of a dying
declaration is efficacious whether it speaks of a murder or a
robbery or a fraudulent will; and the necessity being the same,
Elliott on Evidence says,
the admissibility is the same."
"There is no reason why dying declarations should not be
used in civil as well as criminal cases." (Elliott, Vol. 1, Sec.
351.) An Oregon statute, passed in 1909, says that "Evidence may be given on the trial of the following facts * * *
(4) The declaration or act of a dying person, made or done
under a sense of impending death, respecting the cause of his
death." (Oregon Statutes, Title 9, Sec. 226.) This statute
applies to both civil and criminal cases, since it was enacted to
amend the act then in operation, of which only the words, "in
criminal actions" were stricken. It was so construed in McCarty v. Sirianni, 285 P. 825, in 1930, an action for the death
of plaintiff's intestate resulting from injuries sustained in an
automobile collision; and the dying declarations of the decedent respecting the cause of his injuries were held admissible to
the same extent and under the same limitations as evidence of
such declarations made in a case of homicide. The court there
said, "Under Clause 4 of this section, the dying declaration of
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a deceased person is admissible in a civil action." This statute
does not abrogate the rule set out in State v. Garrand,5 Ore.
216, that a dying declaration must be made under a consciousness of impending death; and therefore, it probably contains
this requisite, which is found in the Colorado statute also.
However, this statute does not appear to go as far as the Colorado statute and would apply only to actions for wrongful
death, and the testimony must apply to the circumstances respecting the cause of the death.
A North Carolina statute, passed in 1919, says, "In cases
where the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, such as would, if the injured party had
lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the
person who would have been so liable shall be liable to an action for damages. * * * In all actions brought under this
section, the dying declarations of the deceased as to the cause
of his death should be admissible in evidence in like manner
and under the same rules as dying declarations of deceased in
criminal actions for homicide are now received in evidence."
Here,
(North Carolina Code, 1935, Chap. 1, Sec. 160.)
again, the statute does not go as far as the Colorado statute
and limits the admissibility of such evidence in civil actions to
a greater extent.
A Massachusetts statute states the rule that, "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence
as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant." (Massachusetts General Laws,
Chap. 233, Sec. 65.) The statute was construed in Brady v.
Doherty, 149 N. E. 198, a Massachusetts case decided in 1925,
in which the court said, "In actions at law and suits in equity,
declarations of a deceased person formerly excluded as hearsay
are admissible under the statute. But this does not apply to
statements of a testator as evidence for or against the validity
of a will." On the face of it, this statute seems to go even
further than the Colorado statute and is not hampered by any
of the restrictions found in the Colorado statute. However,
the Massachusetts statute seems to have been invoked only in
cases in which the declaration was not made under a sense of
impending death, but in which the declarant had simply deceased subsequent to his making the declaration, and was there-
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fore not available. Thus, it would seem that this statute does
not apply strictly to dying declarations, although I believe it
could be invoked in a civil or criminal case in which it was
desired to introduce the dying declaration of a person as we
understand the term.
No other state appears to have changed the rule by statute, but Kansas has done so by judicial decision. In the case
of Thurston v. Fritz, supra, decided in 1914, the action was
one for the recovery of the balance due from the defendants
for a tract of land formerly owned by the plaintiff's testator.
The testator, under the belief that he was about to die, signed
a statement purporting to give the facts of the transaction involved. The court held that this evidence should have been
allowed, Justice West stating, "The rule that dying declarations are admissible only in criminal cases is without reasonable basis and should no longer be followed." This rule seems
to be that which is closest to the Colorado statute, though the
restrictions to the rule found in the Colorado statute are not
set out in the opinion itself.
The Colorado statute, having been passed at so recent a
date, has not, as yet, been construed by the Supreme Court, so
the various problems which might arise under it, and which
we shall proceed to discuss, are really matters of conjecture, the
solutions of which we can only determine at this time by examining decisions of this state concerning dying declarations
made before the statute was enacted and decisions arrived at
by states having similar statutes, as well as states having no
such statute, but which have given certain constructions to the
rule when applying it in homicide cases. Since it was such
writers as Wigmore who led to the adoption of our statute, it
can be assumed, also, that our court may turn to their discussions of the various phases of the rule.
When the statute says that the declaration must be made
under a sense of impending death, it leaves unsettled the question as to how that apprehension might be shown, whether by
words of the declarant, or circumstances, or words and circumstances. The Colorado case of Weaver v. People, 47 Colo.
617, 100 P. 331 (1910), stated that it is essential to the admission of dying declarations that they be made under a sense
of impending death, but it is not necessary that the person
making them state at the time that they are so made, as that
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fact may be proved either by the express language of the declarant, or be inferred from the evident danger, or the opinions
of attendants stated to him, or from his conduct or other circumstances of the case. In accord with this case are People v.
Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 (1881); People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164
(1882); People v. Vukejovich, 143 P. 1058 (Cal. App.,
1914); State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456; State v. Ju
Nun, 53 Ore. 1. Again, in Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192,
34 P. (2d) 71 (1934), it was said that to make a dying declaration admissible, it is not necessary that the declarant should
have stated at the time that it was made under a sense of impending death. State v. Franklin, 192 N. C. 723, 135 S. E.
859 (1927), held that dying declarations by one conscious
of approaching death are admissible, though he did not declare
that he was dying; and State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E.
604 (1930) stated that for the admission of dying declarations, the declarant need not have expressed belief in impending demise, if the circumstances indicated that decedent was
fully under the influence of the solemnity of such belief and
so near death as to "lose the use of all deceit." Wigmore states
that "consciousness of approaching death may be determined
by all the attending circumstances. Any means of inferring
the existence of such knowledge is sufficient and such is the
settled judicial attitude. The circumstances of each case will
show whether the requisite consciousness existed. (Wigmore,
Vol. 3, 2d Ed., Sec. 1442.) A slight variation of this rule is
to be found in Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238 P. 25
(1925), a prosecution for murder, in which, on the question
of the admissibility of dying declarations, the court said that
how the deceased obtained or how he expressed an understanding that he was about to die is immaterial. Another modification of the rule is stated in People v. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19
(1883), in which the court said that the sense of impending
death may be shown by one witness and the dying declaration
proved by another. There does not seem to be anything in the
Colorado statute which would abolish the rule set out in the
above stated Colorado cases, and the circumstance that the two
North Carolina cases were decided subsequently to the enactment of their statute allowing dying declarations in civil actions to a limited extent and that the two Oregon cases were
decided only a year before the enactment of the statute in that
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state, besides the fact that Wigmore, whom this state has followed so closely in adopting a more liberal application of the
rules concerning dying declarations, was in accord with this
rule, lends weight to the proposition that Colorado would
still, under the 1937 statute, allow the apprehension of pending death to be shown by either the words of the declarant or
the circumstances of the case, or both.
Once it has been determined that the declaration was actually made under a sense of impending death, the question
arises, "Suppose the declarant, having made an admissible dying declaration, later regains hope?" The Kansas case of State
v.Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894) sets out the rule that
the fact that death did not immediately ensue after the declarations and that the declarant subsequently hoped for recovery
does not prevent their admission as dying declarations; and the
case of State v.Shaffer, 23 Ore. 555, 32 P. 545 (1893), held
that where dying declarations admitted in evidence were made
in the morning, evidence of declarations made in the afternoon,
expressing a hope of recovery, is inadmissible, being immaterial. State v. Wilmhusse, 8 Idaho 608, 70 P. 849 (1902),
stated that evidence that a person making a dying declaration
was incompetent to do so two days after it was made is inadmissible. It must be confined to the time of making the declaration. The California Civil Code, Sec. 1870, says, "In criminal actions, one who believes he is about to die and entertains
no hope for recovery is a dying person; and a statement made
in that belief, relating to the cause of his injury, is admissible
where it appears that he subsequently died from the direct
effects of his wound, though he may have revived after making
the statement, or he may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and may have again begun to hope for recovery." Wigmore states that "a subsequent change of the expectation of
death by the recurrence of a hope of life does not render inadmissible a prior declaration made while the consciousness prevailed, though a repetition of the declaration during the subsequent inadequate state of mind would not be admissible.
(Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2ndEd., Sec. 1439.) It seems, from these
authorities and decisions, that a recurrence of a hope of life
after the declaration has been made will not render the declaration inadmissible, and it does not appear that the Colorado
courts would be constrained to hold differently. The wording
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of the statute is that "at the time of the making of such declaration, he was conscious of approaching death and believed
there was no hope of recovery." The statute says nothing
concerning the later return of hope in the breast of the declarant, and would probably, along with the weight of authority,
allow the declarations. However, this does not dispose of the
further problem of a declarant who, after making a dying declaration under a sense of impending death, later recovers but
becomes unavailable in court because of insanity, absence from
the jurisdiction, or some similar disability. On this proposition the above authorities are silent, although the California
Code says that dying declarations as to the cause of the injury
are admissible where the declarant subsequently died from the
direct effects of his wound. It seems probable that if the Colorado statute should be construed strictly as it stands, the
words, "The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be
admissible * * *" mean that the person must be actually
deceased, and that if he should later recover, even though he
be unavailable, his testimony may not be admitted as a dying
declaration. I don't believe that a broader construction can
be given to the words of the statute. Also, North Carolina,
having a statute similar to ours, held in the case of State v.
Wallace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E. 716 (1932), that dying
declarations are admissible only if the declarant was in actual
danger of death and fully apprehended such danger when they
were made, and death ensued before they were offered. Greater
weight may be added to this contention as to how Colorado
would hold by the words of Elliott, "The declarant must be
(Elliott, Vol. 1,
dead when the declarations are offered."
Sec. 347.)
From this follows the question of whether the declarant
may, under a sense of impending death, reaffirm a declaration
which was not made under a sense of impending death. In
Flor v. People, 73 Colo. 403, 215 P. 875 (1923), a prosecution for murder, where it appeared that the declarant had made
oral statements, identified the defendant, and signed a written
declaration, naming the defendant before being told that death
was imminent, but later affirmed these statements after being
so told, it was held that such dying declarations should be
admitted. In accord with this is People v. Crews, 102 Cal.
174, 36P. 367 (1894). ButPeople v. Smith, 164 Cal. 451,
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129 P. 785, adds that while such statements may be reaffirmed,
later statements made by the declarant when he either could
not appreciate their consequences or, due to extreme illness or
recklessness, was willing to give the answers he thought
wanted, were not sufficient to show a reaffirmance. The case
of State v. Barbour, 142 Kan. 200, 46 P. (2d) 841 (1935),
held that in a murder prosecution, a dying declaration was
competent, notwithstanding the fact that it was taken by
question and answer a few days before the declarant had lost
hope of life, when it was restated and confirmed as true at a
time when clearly he had lost much hope. Wigmore states
that "a declaration made during an inadequate state of mind
may become admissible by a subsequent affirmance of it, made
when the realization of impending death has supervened."
The wording of
(Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1439.)
the Colorado statute, however, is that "at the time of the making of such declarationhe was conscious of approaching death
and believed there was no hope of recovery. It is manifest
that this leaves little room for a construction which would say
that although at the time of making the declaration, the declarant was not conscious of approaching death, he later
became conscious of pending death and reaffirmed his declaration, and therefore it should be admitted in evidence. He must
have been conscious of the pendency of death at the time he
made the declaration.
The question arises of how immediate after the making
of the declaration must be the death of the declarant, or how
close at hand the decease must appear to the declarant himself.
In Regina v. Gloster, 16 Cox, c. c. 471, Charles, J., said, "The
declarant must be under a settled, hopeless expectation of
death. Immediate death must be construed in the sense of
death impending, not on the instant, but within a very, very
short period indeed. In other words, the test is whether all
hope of life has been abandoned, so that the person making the
statement thinks that death must follow." The authority of
the cases and writers cited in our last section would seem to
stand for the more modern principle that there need only be a
relinquishing of all hope and a pendency of death, and it is not
essential that such death be seen as immediate. Garcia v. People, 64 Colo. 172, 171 P. 754 (1918), decided that the statement of one who expected to die was admissible, though he
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lived for fifteen days. I believe this proposition would be followed by the court in construing the Colorado statute, and we
may say that the requisite of definite apprehension of death
having been met, there is no definite period of time within
which the declarant must have contemplated his decease, but
that it must be short enough to have rendered his statement as
made "in the fear of shortly meeting his Maker."
The problem has often been brought before the courts,
and will likely be brought before the Colorado court, of
whether the dying declarations are admissible if there be other
evidence also available, or in other words, whether the necessity actually must exist. The older authorities seem to hold to
the doctrine that the necessity must exist, so as to justify the
rule allowing dying declarations on the basis of the lack of
other evidence. But the trend has been to break away from
this point of view. Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546 (1925),
stands for the proposition that the declaration is admissible
even if the facts can be shown otherwise. In McCredie v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 142 Ore. 229, 20 P. (2d)
232 (1933), the court said the condition that the declarant
must be the only eye-witness is not a prerequisite to the introduction of dying declarations. Elliott states, "It has been
urged that dying declarations should not be admitted where
there is no necessity, as where there are other competent eyewitnesses. But the weight of authority is to the effect that
admissibility of dying declarations is not dependent upon the
absence of other evidence of the same facts. Neither is the
declaration necessarily excluded by the circumstance that the
fact of the killing is conceded by the accused." Thus, I believe
we may say that, following the rules of the Colorado case and
the other authorities above cited, nothing in the statute being
to the contrary, Colorado would say that dying declarations
may be admitted in evidence along with other testimony on
the same point.
A question which is certain to come before the courts in
Colorado and the rule of which may have been entirely
changed in this state by the statute, is that of whether the declaration must be confined to the actual cause of the death of
the declarant and the circumstances surrounding such death.
The Oregon case of State v. Fuller, supra, decided in 1908,
stated that the dying declarations of a woman on whom an
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abortion has been performed are not admissible where her
death is not an essential element of the offense, which is complete without it; but where her death is, by statute, an indispensable element of the crime charged, her dying declarations
are admissible. This despite an Oregon statute which says
that, "one performing an abortion shall, in case of the death
of the woman, be guilty of manslaughter, and the dying declarations of such woman are, so far as they explain the circumstances attending the injury causing death, competent." A
Colorado court of appeals case, in 1894, held that where an
autopsy shows that the injuries were not the cause of the death,
the dying declarations of the deceased as to who inflicted the
injuries are not admissible. North Carolina, having a statute
similar to ours, held, in 1933, that dying declarations must be
confined to facts connected with the act of killing and forming
a part of the res gestae (State v. Layton, 204 N. C. 704, 169
S. E. 650); and State v. Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E.
422, affirmed this decision and added that the declarations
were not competent as to acts antecedent and unrelated to the
act causing death. Statev. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154S. E. 604
(1930), decided that dying declarations are not rendered incompetent because they contain statements tending to show
provocation or lack thereof on the part of the accused, when
such utterances relate immediately to the act of killing. In
accord with the proposition that the declarations are admissible only where they relate to the circumstances of the death
or are part of the res gestae are State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257
(1872); People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 11 P. 323
(1909); State v. Swartz, 188 Wash. 21, 182 P. 953. An
extension of the rule is to be found in People v. Cipolla, 155
Cal. 224, 100 P. 252, which held that the res gestae embraces
not only the actual facts of the assault and the circumstances
surrounding it, but matters antecedent to it, as well as the acts
immediately following the assault. State v. Le Duc, 89 Mont.
545, 300 P. 919 (1931), restated that statement in a dying
declaration that the defendant struck a third person was admissible as part of the res gestae of the killing. An even further extension is shown in State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85
P. 251 (1906), which said that dying declarations are admissible though the description given does not identify the person
who did the shooting as the defendant, it being enough that
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they add a link in the chain of evidence. Finally, People v.
Attema, 75 Cal. App. 642, 243 P. 461 (1926), decided that
statements in a dying declaration are admissible though not
strictly res gestae. It is to be noted, however, that in all the
above cases, the action was one for the death of the declarant.
The Colorado statute allows dying declarations in both civil
and criminal actions of any nature. Hence, a dying declaration could not be restricted to the res gestae or circumstances
of the declarant's death. The statute says, "The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be admissible

*

*

*

to

the same extent and for the same purposes that they might
have been admissible had the deceased survived and been sworn
as a witness in the proceedings." Thus, where the action is
not a criminal prosecution or a civil action for the death of the
declarant, it would seem that the dying declarations might be
admitted to prove the truth of any matter occurring at any
time previous to the declaration, as, for instance, that the declarant had loaned money to the defendant at some time past,
and which the defendant now owes to the estate of the declarant. Such matter would be allowable in evidence if the declarant had been alive and so testified on the stand, and under the
statute, it should be admissible as his dying declaration. If
such dying declarations be admissible in civil actions in which
the cause being tried is not the death of the declarant, there
seems to be no logical reason why they should not be allowed
in criminal prosecutions or civil actions for the death of the
declarant as well. The declarant, if alive, could testify as to
matters not a part of the res gestae, which led to the assault on
him, from which it so happens that he died. Thus, we may
say that in Colorado, under the statute, dying declarations
need not be confined to the circumstances or the res gestae of
the killing of the declarant.
A very important question is that of how far a declarant
may go in stating his opinions or conclusions in a dying declaration. In Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471
(1912), it was held that "opinions in dying declarations are
inadmissible. It is indispensable that the dying declarations
should consist only of facts, and not of conclusions, mental
* impressions, or opinions." This seems to be the general rule.
The courts are not, however, in harmony as to what constitutes an opinion and what constitutes the statement of a fact
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within the rule stated, although all seem to agree that the statement by the declarant of a conclusion founded upon an inferred, as distinguished from an actual fact within his knowledge is objectionable. This rule is clearly stated in House v.
State, 94 Miss. 107, 48 S. 3, in which the court says, "To us,
the true and proper test as to admissibility is whether the statement is the direct result of observation through declarant's
senses, or comes from a source of reasoning from collateral
facts. If the former, it is admissible; if the latter, it is inadmissible." State v. Wright, 112 Ia. 436, 84 N. W. 541, rejected
a dying declaration to the effect that the deceased stated that he
did not think the defendant intended to shoot him, and further
that he thought defendant was crazy, the court saying that
declarations made under the solemn sense of approaching death
are only competent as to facts to which the witness might testify if living. In Hollywood v. State, supra, the facts surrounding the homicide were all testified to by eye-witnesses,
and there was no question of the identity of the accused; the
dying declaration of the decedent that the accused was not to
blame, but that it was decedent's own fault was excluded as
mere opinion. In an early Colorado court of appeals case, McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 87 P. 953 (1894), a statement by the declarant that "my husband has killed me," based
on the theory of her physician that her death was the result of
certain external injuries, was held inadmissible as a dying declaration, being merely the deceased's opinion. Again in Jamison v. People, 52 Colo. 11, 119 P. 474, where the decedent,
after having been shot, stated that the accused had murdered
him, such statement, although made with a realization of impending death, was inadmissible as a dying declaration, because it stated a conclusion. These Colorado cases, however,
seem to have gone further than should be permitted in distinguishing between fact and. opinion. The statement, "He murdered me" should not cease to be competent as a dying declaration merely because in the statement of the act there is also an
appraisal of the crime. The substance of the statement should
be examined, rather than its technical form. Although it
would be improper for a witness on the stand to use equivalent
words to appraise the nature of a man's crime, he could, nevertheless, identify the man by the use of a common expression
such as this; and under the statute such a statement should be
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admitted in a dying declaration also. This is the view of the
court in People v. Vukojevich, 25 Cal. App. 459, 143 P.
1058, in which it was held that a statement by the deceased,
fatally stabbed, that defendant "has killed me" was not an
expression of an opinion or a conclusion. In People v. Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 (1881), it held that one who supposed himself to have been poisoned and who was in fact near death,
though it was not quite apparent that he was aware of it,
said that he "guessed" that the defendant had poisoned him.
This was held inadmissible, the court saying that this was a
mere matter of opinion and not of fact. It was stated in People v. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142, 22 P. 482 (1889), that expressions of opinion by the decedent as to the character of the injuries of which he is dying are inadmissible as dying declarations.
Massachusetts, which, as we have seen, has a statute even more
comprehensive than ours, held in the case of Barney v. Magenis, 135 N. E. 142 (1922), that where one struck by an
automobile and sustaining injuries from which he subsequently died testified that the car dragged him twenty-five to
thirty feet, his further testimony that the car must have been
going thirty to thirty-five miles per hour wes the expression
of a fact derived from the exercise of his own senses, and not
merely an opinion or guess, and was therefore admissible.
Eldridge v. Barton, 122 N. E. 272 (Mass., 1919), decided
that a statement of the deceased that he was at fault and to
blame for the accident was merely the assertion of an opinion,
as distinguished from one of fact; and it was not admissible
under the statute, which requires such a declaration to be made
upon the declarant's personal knowledge. It was held in Little
v. Massachusetts Northeastern St. Ry. Co., 112 N. E. 77
(Mass., 1916), that an opinion expressed by a deceased physician, who had attended plaintiff's intestate, as to the cause of
his condition was not based on his personal knowledge, and
was inadmissible, although the physician, if alive, could have
given such opinion in court without qualifying as an expert.
The North Carolina rule was set out in State v. Beal, supra,
which said that dying declarations are admissible in homicide
cases, provided the declarant, if living and offered as a witness,
would be competent to testify to matters contained in the declarations. Wigmore, on this point, is admittedly contra to the
general rule when he says, "The opinion rule has no applica-
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tion to dying declarations. The theory of the rule is that inferences drawn by the witness can be equally well drawn by
the jury. Since the declarant is here deceased, no more detailed
data may be drawn from him than his statement contains, and
hence, his inferences in this instance are not superfluous, but
are indispensable. But the courts seem to accept the opinion
rule as applicable." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1447.)
Under the Colorado statute, the dying declarations are admitted only to the extent that such declarations would be
allowed if the witness were alive and on the stand. If he were
alive, his opinions would not be admissible in evidence, and I
think that we may say that the Colorado court, under this
statute, would not follow Wigmore's line of reasoning, but
would abide by the weight of authority and the earlier Colorado cases.
The Colorado case of Zipperion v. People, supra, sets out
the rule that written, as well as oral, dying declarations may be
admitted in evidence; and nothing in the statute seems to abrogate this, so long as the written declaration is not a set of
questions and answers. Weaver u. People, supra, held that
where the declarant was shot and believed death was at hand
and his statements were written down by a person present,
though not in the exact language of the decedent, and declarant was asked, when the statements were read to him, if they
were true and if he would affix his signature, to which he
replied, "Yes," but was too weak to affix his signature and
placed his mark, the statements were admissible. It is possible
that under the statute, the Colorado court would overrule this
decision, unless it could be proven beyond a doubt that the
statements were purely voluntary and no persuasion was
brought to bear on the declarant. People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32
(1858), held that if the declarations of the dying person were
reduced to writing, the writing must first be introduced, if
accessible. After that, it may be supported by proof of other
declarations, not so reduced. This would probably be so held
in Colorado. State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 P. 301,
set out that the fact that the dying declaration is made in a
writing which has been lost does not prevent a witness who
heard it from testifying to what was said to and by the declarant, regardless of the contents of the writing. The rule we
have considered as to the reaffirmance of a declaration made
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when declarant was not under a sense of impending death applies also to a later reaffirmance of a written declaration made
before the declarant has given up hope, and it was so held in
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 60 S. W. 400 (Ky.), and State v.
McEvoyt, 19 S. C. 208. Wigmore states, "Where the auditor
of a dying declaration makes in written form a note or report
of the oral utterances, this written statement of the auditor is
not preferred testimony and need not be produced; for no
principle of evidence prefers a person's written memorandum
of testimony to his or another person's oral or recollection testimony." The author then goes on to say that where such
written memorandum is read to the declarant and assented to
or signed by him, it should become a second and distinct declaration by him, and the two should not become merged.
However, he says, the courts generally require the writing to
be used, excluding testimony as to the oral statement. (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1450.) I believe the Colorado
court would, on this point, be inclined to follow the rule of
Wigmore, rather than that of the majority of the courts, since
the Colorado statute abides by Wigmore's line of reasoning in
spirit, and under it the court would be likely to follow his rules
wherever possible; and it would probably do so here, since
there is nothing in the statute which would prevent it from so
holding.
It is generally held that dying declarations may be impeached in the same manner as if the witness lived and taken
the stand. Cases so holding include.State v. Kocar, 74 Mont.
269, 240 P. 365 (1925); State v. Watts, 52 Nev. 493, 290
P. 732 (1930); McClendon v. State, 360 Okla. Cr. 11, 251
P. 515 (1926); State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456
(1908); State v. Gollegos, 28 N. M. 403, 213 P. 1030
(1923); Liddellv. State, 18Okla. Cr. 87, 193 P. 52 (1920).
The Oregon case of State v. Fuller, supra, said that the statute
prescribing the manner of laying a foundation for the impeachment of a witness by proof of statements inconsistent
with his testimony does not apply to dying declarations, for
no opportunity is offered the accused to interrogate the declarant. The Colorado case of Salas v. People, 51 Colo. 461, 118
P. 992 (1911), held that a dying declaration may be impeached by evidence of other inconsistent statements. But under the present statute, the impeachment could be made in any
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other way as well. At least one case has allowed impeachment
of the witness relating the declaration: State v. Fong Loom,
29 Ida. 248, 158 P. 233 (1916), decided that where the victim of a homicide was a Chinaman, unfamiliar with the
English language, evidence that the interpreter of the dying
declaration was addicted to the use of opium or other drugs
was admissible. Wigmore states, "Declarant is open to impeachment and discrediting in the same way as other witnesses.
This includes prior or subsequent inconsistent statements. So
also, he may be corroborated by evidence of similar consistent
statements." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1446.) Under the Colorado statute, cases in this state would undoubtedly be in accord with the general proposition. The statute
says that "dying declarations shall be admissible * * * to
the same extent and for the same purposes that they might
have been admissible had the deceased survived and been
sworn as a witness in the proceedings." Of course, if the deceased had survived and been sworn as a witness, his testimony
would have been subject to impeachment.
Related to, though not quite the same as, impeachment
of the dying declaration is the question of whether the declarant's religious beliefs may be shown. This is not exactly the
same problem as that of impeachment, because the religious
beliefs of the ordinary witness, when allowed to be brought
into evidence, permitted for the purpose of proving him incapable of taking an oath, whereas they are offered to impeach
dying declarations to prove that the declarant had no fear of
"meeting his Maker" and hence, no motive for telling the
truth. The general rule appears to be that religious beliefs of
the declarant may not be shown. A statement of this rule is
set out in State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Ore. 509, 112 P. 424
(1910), which held that the religious belief or the want
thereof or lack of confidence in a future state of rewards and
punishments is not an element bearing on the credibility or
weight of the declarations, and the lower court properly refused to charge the jury that they could consider, as affecting
the credibility of the declarant, that he did not believe in future
rewards or punishments at the time he made such declarations.
In accord with this case are People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29
(1872); People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 547 (1877);
People v.Lun Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 P. 477. A stat-
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ute exists in Colorado which reads, "No person shall be
deemed incompetent to testify as a witness on account of his
or her opinion in relation to the Supreme Being or a future
state of rewards and punishments; nor shall any witness be
questioned in regard to his or her religious opinions." (Colorado Statutes Annotated, Vol. 4, Chap. 177, Sec. 7.) Although, as I have stated above, a distinction exists between the
rules as to the religious beliefs of witnesses and those of the
makers of dying declarations, I believe Colorado would, as
other states have done, apply the statute to dying declarations.
Thus in the California case of People v. Sanford, supra, the
court held that since in that state no person is incompetent as
a witness on account of his religious beliefs, a dying declaration
is admissible, though the declarant has said nothing in regard
to his responsibility to his Maker.
A question which has come before the courts on numerous occasions is the problem of who determines the competency of a dying declaration, and once the declaration is admitted, who determines what weight and credibility shall be
given to it. It is well settled that the competency of the declaration is to be determined by the court and the weight and
credibility to be given to it are determined by the jury. In
accord with this rule are Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 86
P. 79 (1906); Flor v. People, 73 Colo. 403, 215 P. 875
(1923); State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894);
State v. Shaffer, 23 Ore. 555, 32 P. 545 (1893); State v.
Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456. The case of Willoughby v.
Territory, 16 Okla. 577, 86 P. 56 (1906), set out the rule
that the court's failure to pass on the question of competency
as evidence of a dying declaration and submission of such declaration to the jury without first passing on such competency
is error. I believe that undoubtedly, the Colorado court
would hold with the majority and earlier Colorado cases as
to the determination of the competency and the weight and
credibility of such declarations, since such a holding would be
perfectly consistent with the statute. The competency and
admissibility in evidence of any other testimony is determined
by the court, and there is no reason why this should not apply
to dying declarations as well.
The only cases discussing the point hold that dying declarations are available in behalf of the accused, as well as
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against him. Such was the doctrine in People v. Southern,
120 Cal. 645, 53 P. 214 (1898), in which the court said that
dying declarations are admissible in behalf of the accused to
show that the killing was by another person. In accord are
People v. Costa, 67 Cal. App. 175, 227 P. 201, and Morehead
v. State, 120 Okla. Cr. 62, 151 P. 1183. Wigmore, on this
point, says, "The theory that the dying declarations cannot
be used by the accused has no foundation whatever and has
been generally repudiated." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec.
1452.) The court in this state would probably follow the
general line of authority and Wigmore on this question, since
there is nothing in the statute which would prohibit such a
holding.
The problem may arise of whether the dying declaration
of a person, in which he states the dying declaration of another,
would be admissible. In states holding that the statements in
the dying declaration must relate to the circumstances of the
death, such a dying declaration would obviously not be admissible. However, in Colorado, where the dying declaration
need not be so confined, there seems to be no reason for so
excluding it, except for the fact that the dying declaration
would be mere hearsay evidence, and hearsay not being admissible by a witness on the stand, the Colorado statute would
probably not allow such dying declaration. It is true that
dying declarations are themselves hearsay, as related by the
auditor of the declaration; but they are statements of facts
arising from actual knowledge of the declarant and when admitted in evidence, the knowledge of the declarant himself is
not derived from hearsay. Knowledge of the declarant obtained from the dying declaration of another declarant is hearsay. Thus, if the declarant himself had survived and were on
the stand, he would not be allowed to give hearsay testimony,
and under the statute, the testimony related to the witness by
the declarant, who learned it from hearsay, cannot be admitted.
A question which has sometimes been disputed is that of
whether, when A is accused of having killed X and Y and is
on-trial for the murder of X, the dying declaration of Y should
be admitted. The courts seem to be split on this point. In
Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 Ky. 709, 268 S. W. 346
(1925), Hayes, Dunn, and Mathews were killed. As to the
admissibility of the dying declaration of Dunn, on the trial of
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the defendant for the murder of Hayes, the court said, "It is
well settled that dying declarations are admissible only in those
criminal cases where the death of the deceased is the subject of
the charge, and the dying declaration of a witness to a homicide
is not admissible although he was a party to the controversy
resulting in the homicide." In accord with this are State v.
Fitzhugh, 2 Ore. 227 (1867), and State v. Bohan, 15 Kan.
407 (1875). Contra to it are State v. Tewell (S. C.), 12
Rich. 321, and State v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558. Since we
have seen that Colorado, under the statute, would probably
say that dying declarations need not be confined to the res gestae or the circumstances surrounding the murder in a homicide
case, and there is no reason why, in Colorado, a witness to a
homicide cannot state the facts of the homicide in a dying declaration, Colorado would probably hold that such a dying
declaration could be given.
Generally speaking, dying declarations are safe evidence,
and the ends of justice are promoted by permitting them. But
I am inclined to believe that the Colorado statute goes a trifle
too far, in allowing such evidence to the same extent as if the
declarant had been alive and sworn as a witness, when it is
borne in mind that the adverse party has not the power of
cross-examination and the declarant is not under oath. It
should also be recollected that in some cases, passion, hatred,
and other feelings of like nature will have their effect, even at
the point of death; and it is infinitely more difficult to impeach
the statement of the declarant for these grounds than it would
be to impeach the testimony of a living witness. Thus, dying
declarations should not be given the same weight and value by
a jury as should the testimony of a living witness. It is true,
the statute applies only to the acceptance of the declarations in
evidence, and such a wide latitude in their admissibility would
be most commendable if we could be assured that juries would
not place too much weight upon such evidence. But the rule,
as we have seen, being that the weight and credibility of such
evidence is a question exclusively for the determination of the
jury, the court may not even instruct them as to how much
weight and credibility to give to the dying declarations. Nevertheless, there no longer exists any reason why, if such evidence is to be admitted in cases of homicide, it should not be
admitted in other criminal and in civil cases as well; and the
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Colorado statute has taken a long stride in letting down the
bars to a great field of evidence otherwise not admissible and
which is often the only evidence obtainable, or is very important evidence in the determination of a cause. The state is to
be highly lauded on expanding the former much too narrow
application of the rule as to the admissibility in evidence of
dying declarations.
SURVEY OF EL PASO COUNTY COURT RECORDS

REVEALS PROBATE PROCEDURE IS SLOW
AND COSTLY
Less Than a Third of the Bar Get Four-Fifths of the Work
Reported by NORMAN W. BAKER*

AYMEN often ask the lawyer, "How long does it take
to settle an estate?" Although knowing the layman's
~usual
incomprehension of, and impatience with, the time
consumed to satisfy requirements of the law, the lawyer in all
sincerity is usually apt to reply that it will take approximately
a year or fourteen months if the estate doesn't get into litigation or encounter some similar delay. In Colorado such a
statement is probably misleading-that is, it is misleading if
the experience elsewhere is the same as in El Paso County. A
comprehensive survey of the probate records of that county
recently completed by the writer brought out the fact that the
averagetime elapsed in all the estates from the filing of affidavit
of decease or other first paper to the entry of decree of final settlement (or order of discharge, if any) runs from about twice
to almost thrice the above time, depending upon the size of the
estate."
Before attempting to point out other interesting facts of
probate practice revealed by this study, something might well
be said about the nature of the survey itself. From the files of
every decedent's estate filed in the El Paso County Court in the
four-year period from January 1, 1933, to January 1, 1937,
wherein the gross inventoried value was $7,500 or more, thir*Of Colorado Springs. Member of the El Paso Bar Association and member of
the State Bar Committee on Economic Survey.
'See Table 1 for exact averages.

